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SEPARATING DICK AND JANE: SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC
EDUCATION UNDER THE WASHINGTON STATE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Inessa Baram-Blackwell
Abstract: Single-sex education in public school systems has become increasingly popular
in recent years. The Equal Rights Amendment to the Washington State Constitution (ERA)
requires that males and females be treated equally where state action, such as public
education, is involved. As demonstrated by the ERA's legislative history and Washington
case law, the ERA prohibits differentiation on the basis of sex alone, which occurs where an
individual would be treated differently in a given situation if that person were of the opposite
sex. Legislative history and case law recognize two narrow exceptions to the ERA. Under the
first exception, classification based on sex is permissible if it is based on actual physical
differences between the sexes. The second exception allows sex-based distinctions in the
context of affirmative action programs intended solely to ameliorate the effects of past
discrimination. This Comment argues that based on the Amendment's plain meaning and
legislative history, as well as both binding and persuasive precedent, single-sex public
education contravenes the ERA by differentiating on the basis of sex alone. Single-sex public
education violates the ERA based on the plain meaning of the Amendment, which mandates
equality between the sexes. Single-sex public education also runs afoul of the ERA by
effecting arbitrary sex-based classifications: but for a given student's sex, that student would
be allowed into a particular class or school. Moreover, a Pennsylvania court has held that
single-sex public education violates Pennsylvania's ERA, which parallels Washington's ERA
in language, purpose, and application. Finally, single-sex public education does not currently
satisfy either of the two narrow exceptions to Washington's ERA: learning does not involve
an actual physical difference between the sexes, and single-sex classes and schools are not
affirmative action programs intended solely to mitigate the effects of past discrimination.
Sam, a public school student, is excited about the upcoming academic
year, and especially about biology class with a new biology teacher.t
The school recruited the new teacher because of his charisma and
impressive credentials. Biology is Sam's best subject, and Sam has been
in a study group with Josh and Daniel for the last four years. All three
students aspire to be biologists and have been good friends since they
met in the first grade. Even though summer vacation has not yet ended,
the three have already begun brainstorming what they hope will be the
winning entry in the school's science fair. Before the academic year
begins, however, the school board decides to make all science classes
single-sex. Josh and Daniel will be together in the new biology teacher's
class, but because Sam (Samantha) is a girl, she will be required to take
1. Hypothetical scenario created by the author for illustrative purposes.
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biology with the other girls. Sam is upset, and her parents worry that
their daughter's chances of receiving a meaningful education in biology
have been squelched.
Although the overwhelming majority of public schools in the United
States today are coeducational, interest in single-sex public education
has surged in recent years. 2 Ten years ago, only a handful of single-sex
public schools existed in the United States. 3 By the 2005-06 academic
year, however, a single-sex learning experience was available at more
than 200 public schools across the country.4 In Washington, Seattle's
Thurgood Marshall Elementary School and Olympia's Washington
Middle School offer their students a single-sex learning experience.5 Its
proponents contend that, among other things, single-sex education
counteracts stereotypes, 6 reduces discrimination in the classroom, 7 and
2. See Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia.
Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381,
389; see also Tat Barak, Number of Single-Sex Schools Growing: N.Y.C.-Based Network Opens
Schools for Girls in Urban Districts, EDUC. WK., Oct. 20, 2004, at 33; Nat'l Ass'n for Single Sex
Pub. Educ., Single-Sex Education, http://www.singlesexschools.org/home-introduction.htm (last
visited Apr. 25, 2006).
3. See Nat'l Ass'n for Single Sex Pub. Educ., Single-Sex Schools,
http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-schools.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2006) [hereinafter
NASSPE, Schools].
4. See id. The term "single-sex school" is actually somewhat of a misnomer because single-sex
educational opportunities can take multiple forms. See, e.g., Ashley Elizabeth Johnson, Note,
Single-Sex Classes in Public Secondary Schools: Maximizing the Value of a Public Education for
the Nation's Students, 57 VAND. L. REv. 629, 633 (2004). At one end of the spectrum are schools
that admit students of only one sex. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 3. Baltimore's Western High
School, which serves only girls, is one of the oldest examples. Id. Further along the single-sex
education spectrum are coeducational schools in which all classes are single-sex. Id. Seattle's
Thurgood Marshall Elementary School is one example. Id. Both boys and girls attend Thurgood
Marshall, but all classes are comprised of either all boys or all girls. Id. At the far end of the
spectrum are coeducational schools that have a limited number of single-sex classes, with the
remaining classes being coeducational. See Nat'l Ass'n for Single Sex Pub. Educ., Single-Sex
Classrooms, http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-classrooms.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2006)
[hereinafter NASSPE, Classrooms]. Washington Middle School, located in Olympia, Washington,
falls into this category of schools. Id.
5. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 3; NASSPE, Classrooms, supra note 4. The website of the
National Association for Single Sex Public Education (NASSPE) also lists Cedar River Middle
School in Maple Valley, Washington, as a school with single-sex classes. Id. According to a school
official, however, the school has discontinued its single-sex offerings. Telephone Interview with
Valerie Karlsson, Para-educator, Cedar River Middle Sch. (Mar. 16, 2006).
6. See, e.g., Valerie E. Lee & Helen M. Marks, Sustained Effects of the Single-Sex Secondary
School Experience on Attitudes, Behaviors, and Values in College, 82 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 578, 588
(1990).
7. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 4, at 631-32.
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shrinks the gender gap in math and science.8 Some proponents also
argue that single-sex education is particularly beneficial for female
students, 9 minority students, 10 and students from low-income homes. I'
Furthermore, single-sex public education provides poor and minority
children with single-sex educational opportunities that their families
might not otherwise be able to afford.
12
The Equal Rights Amendment to the Washington State Constitution
(ERA) 13 places substantive limits on how state actors, such as public
schools, may operate.' 4 The ERA is predicated on equality between the
sexes. 15 Thus, under the ERA, nearly all classifications based on sex are
invalid.16 Specifically, the ERA prohibits distinctions on the basis of sex
alone, by which, but for an individual's sex, that person would be treated
8. See, e.g., Fred A. Mael, Single-Sex and Coeducational Schooling: Relationships to
Socioemotional and Academic Development, 68 REV. EDUC. RES. 101, 108-09 (1998).
9. See, e.g., Lee & Marks, supra note 6. But see, e.g., CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR
AGAINST BOYS: HOW MISGUIDED FEMINISM IS HARMING OUR YOUNG MEN 14, 24-27 (2000)
(arguing that "it is boys, not girls, who are languishing academically" and highlighting various
educational problems that boys face).
10. See, e.g., CORNELIUS RIORDAN, GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL: TOGETHER OR SEPARATE?
147-48 (1990).
11. See, e.g., id. at 147.
12. See, e.g., KAREN STAB]NER, ALL GIRLS: SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION AND WHY IT MATTERS 44-
45 (2002).
Opponents of single-sex public education, on the other hand, argue that, among other things,
single-sex education reinforces stereotypes, see, e.g., STABINER, supra note 12, at 314, and fails to
teach boys and girls how to relate to one another, a skill that becomes critical when children reach
adulthood and must function alongside the opposite sex in the workplace, see, e.g., Nancy Levit,
Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 473 (1999). Opponents also contend that "variables other than sex"
account for the apparent advantages of single-sex education and that the studies finding such
advantages do not sufficiently control for these factors. Id. at 485-86.
13. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § I.
14. For the ERA to be applicable, "state action" must be involved. See MacLean v. First Nw.
Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 347, 635 P.2d 683, 688 (1981). Public schools are state actors
and thus subject to the ERA. See Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 906 (1971). This Comment
does not address private schools, which generally do not fall under the ambit of the ERA. See id. at
906-07.
15. See WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 346 (Wash.
1972); Statement for HJR 61, in OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY,
NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 52 (1972).
16. See Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109,
127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 871, 540 P.2d 882, 889
(1975).
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the same as others in a given situation. 17 Under the first of two narrow
exceptions to the ERA, differentiation based on sex is lawful where the
classification is based on actual physical differences between the sexes. 
18
Under the second exception, sex-based distinctions are permissible as
part of an affirmative action program intended solely to ameliorate the
effects of past discrimination.'
9
This Comment argues that single-sex public education in Washington
State violates the ERA by differentiating solely on the basis of sex.
Single-sex public education contravenes the ERA's plain meaning and
its legislative history, and disregards both binding and persuasive
judicial precedent. 20 But for a particular student's sex, that student would
be assigned to a different class or school with a different teacher, peer
group, and classroom dynamic.2 ' This Comment further argues that
single-sex public education does not currently satisfy either of the two
narrow exceptions to the ERA.
2
Part I of this Comment outlines the method by which Washington
courts interpret the state constitution. Part II describes the ERA's
prohibition of distinctions based solely on sex, as evidenced by the
ERA's plain meaning and legislative history, as well as Washington case
17. See, e.g., Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 666, 940 P.2d 642, 645 (1997); Lundgren v.
Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 96, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980); Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 877-78,
540 P.2d at 893.
18. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978).
19. See Elec. Contractors, 100 Wash. 2d at 127-28, 667 P.2d at 1102.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See infra Part IV.B.
22. See infra Part IV.C. As the interest in and availability of single-sex public education has
increased, its legality is increasingly questioned. In Washington, various sources of state law bear
on the issue of whether single-sex public education is permissible. This Comment focuses
exclusively on the legality of single-sex public education under the ERA. However, the Washington
State Constitution contains other relevant bases for analysis, including the Education Article,
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § I (providing in relevant part that "[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to
make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without
distinction or preference on account of... sex"), and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art.
I, § 12 (mandating that "[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen [or] class of
citizens ... privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens"). In addition to these constitutional provisions, Washington's Law Against Discrimination,
see WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.010-401 (2004), other state statutes, see, e.g., id. §§ 28A.640.010-
.900 (sexual equality in public education), and portions of the Washington Administrative Code,
see, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE 392-190-050 (2005) (sex discrimination in public education), bear
on the legality of single-sex public education. Although also outside the scope of this Comment, the
legality of single-sex public education in the context of federal law is still up for debate, especially
given high-profile cases such as United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (holding that
the Virginia Military Institute, a prestigious military academy, may not deny women admission).
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law. Part II also discusses the two exceptions to the ERA that
Washington courts recognize. Part III details the method by which a
Pennsylvania court has interpreted an analogous constitutional provision.
Part IV argues that in light of the plain meaning of the ERA, the
Amendment's legislative history, and binding and persuasive precedent,
single-sex public education violates the ERA by using sex as an
exclusive classifying tool. Part IV further argues that single-sex public
education does not presently satisfy either of the two narrow exceptions
to the ERA.
1. WASHINGTON COURTS CONSIDER VARIOUS SOURCES IN
INTERPRETING THE STATE CONSTITUTION
When Washington courts interpret the state constitution, they look to
a provision's plain meaning,23 its legislative history,24 and binding and
persuasive precedent.25 Washington courts first examine a section's plain
language, according it "its reasonable interpretation., 26 If the ordinary
meaning of a provision is ambiguous, Washington courts next look to
extrinsic sources, 27 such as the official voters' pamphlets that are part of
an amendment's legislative history.28 Washington courts also look to
existing precedent when interpreting the state constitution.29 Finally,
Washington courts may consider how other state courts interpret similar
constitutional provisions.3 °
II. WASHINGTON'S ERA PROHIBITS DISTINCTIONS BASED
SOLELY ON SEX
Washington's ERA, which voters approved in 1972,3' generally
23. See Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470, 477, 90 P.3d 42, 45
(2004).
24. See Zachman v. Whirlpool Fin. Corp., 123 Wash. 2d 667, 671, 869 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1994).
25. See Waremart, Inc. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 139 Wash. 2d 623, 638-39, 989 P.2d 524,
532 (1999).
26. See Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d at 477, 90 P.3d at 45.
27. See State ex rel. Swan v. Jones, 47 Wash. 2d 718, 723, 289 P.2d 982, 985 (1955).
28. See Zachman, 123 Wash. 2d at 671, 869 P.2d at 1080.
29. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Hauser, 15 Wash. App. 231, 237, 548 P.2d 333, 337 (1976) (citing
Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975)) (interpreting article 31 of the Washington
State Constitution).
30. See Waremart, 139 Wash. 2d at 638-39, 989 P.2d at 532.
31. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 250 n.4, 522 P.2d 1187, 1190 n.4 (1974).
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prohibits state action that discriminates against individuals solely on the
basis of sex.32 The express language of the ERA mandates that neither
rights nor responsibilities may be denied on account of sex. 33 The ERA's
prohibition of sex discrimination is subject to an absolutist standard of
review.34 Both the legislative history surrounding the passage of
Washington's ERA and subsequent case law interpreting the
Amendment indicate that the ERA prohibits distinctions on the basis of
sex alone.35 Such distinctions occur in situations where, but for an
individual's sex, state actors would treat that person in the same manner
as they treat members of the opposite sex.36 The ERA's legislative
history and subsequent case law recognize two limited exceptions to the
prohibition of sex-based discrimination.37
A. The Plain Meaning of the ERA Requires Sex-Based Equality Under
the Law
According to the plain meaning of the ERA, males and females are
equal under the law with respect to both rights and responsibilities.3" The
ERA provides that "[e]quality of rights and responsibility under the law
32. See Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 864, 540 P.2d at 885.
33. See WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
34. See Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109,
t27, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983); Paul Benjamin Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making
a Difference or Making a Statement?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 907, 911 (1997); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell
& Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience Under State
Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086, 1098 (1977).
35. See, e.g., Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 877, 540 P.2d at 893; SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex.
Sess., at 345-46 (Wash. 1972).
36. See, e.g., Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 661, 940 P.2d 642, 642-43 (1997); Lundgren
v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 96, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980); Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 877-
78, 540 P.2d at 893.
37. See, e.g., Elec. Contractors, 100 Wash. 2d at 127-28, 667 P.2d at 1102; City of Seattle v.
Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978); Brown et al., supra note 14, at 893-94,
903-05, cited with approval in JUDICIARY COMM. OF THE WASH. STATE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 61-THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT-ON THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 2-4 (1972) [hereinafter POTENTIAL
IMPACT] (identifying two possible interpretations of the ERA-the subjective view of Brown et al.,
supra note 14, and the literal view propounded by Washington State Senator Sam Ervin; rejecting
the latter as inapplicable to Washington's ERA; and noting that "lb]ecause of the widespread
acceptance of the [Brown et al.] article by women's rights advocates, we have in this report relied
on it to determine the possible impact of the adoption of [the ERA] on the statute law of
Washington").
38. See WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
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shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex."3 9 According to the
most recent edition of Webster's Dictionary available at the time that the
ERA was passed, "equal" signifies being "of the same quantity, size,
number, value, degree, intensity, quality, etc." and "having the same
rights, privileges, ability, rank, etc.'4° A "right" is defined as a "power,
privilege, etc. that belongs to a person. ' 41 A "responsibility" evinces an
"obligation., 42 The language of the ERA indicates that males and
females have the same powers, privileges, and obligations under the
law. 43 Therefore, under a plain-meaning analysis, state action that
impinges on individuals' rights and responsibilities on the basis of sex
violates the ERA.44
B. Washington Courts Review Sex-Based Classifications Under the
ERA Using an Absolutist Standard
Washington courts employ an absolutist standard in reviewing sex-
based classifications under the ERA.4 5 Before the ERA was approved,
classifications based on sex were subject to a more deferential standard
of review.46 Under the prior method of analysis, Washington courts used
a two-tiered approach: classifications satisfied the first tier if a rational
basis existed to support the classification.47 Under the second tier, if the
classification affected a suspect class (such as sex) 48 or a fundamental
right, it also needed to withstand strict scrutiny.49 With the passage of
the ERA, Washington courts began analyzing sex-based classifications
39. Id.
40. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 472 (2d college ed.
1970).
41. Id. at 1225.
42. Id. at 1211.
43. Cf Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470, 481, 90 P.3d 42, 47
(2004) (relying on dictionary published at time of drafting of a constitutional provision to determine
meaning of that provision).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d
109, 127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983).
46. See Jonathan J. Chun, Survey of Washington Law, Constitutional Law: Sex Discrimination, 15
GONZ. L. REv. 1093, 1096-97 (1980).
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 100, 569 P.2d 1148, 1150 (1977) (noting that
Washington courts consider sex to be a suspect class necessitating strict scrutiny).
49. See Chun, supra note 46, at 1097.
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using a higher, absolutist standard.50 The Washington State Supreme
Court explained the change: "The ERA alone now governs ... review of
sex-based classifications." 51 The court reasoned that by approving the
"broad, sweeping, [and] mandatory language" of the ERA, voters
intended to "add[] something to the prior prevailing law by eliminating
otherwise permissible sex discrimination if the rational relationship or
strict scrutiny tests were met.",
52
C. Both Legislative History and Case Law Demonstrate that the ERA
Prohibits Differentiation on the Basis of Sex Alone
The ERA's legislative history and subsequent case law confirm the
ERA's plain meaning. 3 Specifically, legislative history and case law
indicate that the ERA was intended to mandate equality between the
sexes by prohibiting sex-based distinctions, including separate-but-equal
treatment and the use of sex as a proxy for other characteristics.5 4 Courts
look to whether, but for an individual's sex, a state actor would have
treated that person in the same manner in a given situation.5
1. Legislative History Indicates that the ERA Forbids Differentiation
Based Solely on Sex, Including Separate-but-Equal Treatment and
the Use of Sex as a Proxy for Other Characteristics
The ERA's legislative history demonstrates that distinctions based
solely on sex, including separate-but-equal treatment and the use of sex
as a proxy, run counter to the ERA.56 The ERA is founded on the basic
50. See Elec. Contractors, 100 Wash. 2d at 127, 667 P.2d at 1102; Linton, supra note 34;
Treadwell & Page, supra note 34.
51. Elec. Contractors, 100 Wash. 2d at 128 n.3, 667 P.2d at 1102 n.3.
52. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 871, 540 P.2d 882, 889 (1975).
53. See, e.g., Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 877, 540 P.2d at 893; SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex.
Sess., at 346 (Wash. 1972); Statement for HJR 61, supra note 15.
54. See, e.g., Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 877, 540 P.2d at 893; In re Welfare of Hauser, 15 Wash.
App. 231, 236-37, 548 P.2d 333, 337 (1976); SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46
(Wash. 1972); Brown et al., supra note 14, at 889-90, cited with approval in POTENTIAL IMPACT,
supra note 37.
55. See Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 661, 940 P.2d 642, 642-43 (1997); Lundgren v.
Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 96, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980); Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 877-78,
540 P.2d at 893.
56. See, e.g., SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46 (Wash. 1972); Brown et al.,
supra note 14, at 889-90, cited with approval in POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 37.
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principle "that both sexes be treated equally under the law." 7 Legislators
and voters intended for the ERA to further equality by disallowing
arbitrary sex-based classifications.58 Washington State Senator Pete
Francis noted:
[U]p until now it has been presumed that a distinction on the
basis of sex alone, not on the basis of characteristics, but simply
on the basis of whether you are male or female is an allowable
distinction.... [The ERA] changes that and shifts the burden so
that a great many discriminatory laws will be regarded as
unconstitutional.59
Newspaper articles60 and the voters' pamphlet6' informed voters that the
ERA would prohibit laws that classified solely on the basis of sex.
Legislators did not intend for separate-but-equal treatment to pass
scrutiny under the ERA.62 A Washington State Legislative Council
report detailing the laws that would violate the ERA contemplated two
possible interpretations of the Amendment-a literal view and a
subjective view-and concluded that Washington would follow the
subjective interpretation.63 The subjective view described in the
legislative report was based on the seminal article The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women ("Equal
Rights for Women") 64 that continues to be cited.65 Under the subjective
57. Statement for HJR 61, supra note 15.
58. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46 (Wash. 1972); Effect of HJR No. 61 if
Approved into Law, in OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7,
1972, at 53 (1972); Statement for HJR 61, supra note 15.
59. SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46 (Wash. 1972).
60. See, e.g., Susan Paynter, Equal Rights Amendment-HJR 61-An Emotional Issue for All,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 30, 1972, at A4 (noting that passage of the ERA would
prohibit "arbitrary legal lines" from being drawn based solely on sex).
61. Effect of HJR No. 61 if Approved into Law, supra note 58. For example, courts could no
longer uphold laws that limited the number of hours per day that women, but not men, were allowed
to work in certain industries. See Law as It Now Exists, in OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET: GENERAL
ELECTION TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 53 (1972).
62. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 14, at 890, cited with approval in POTENTIAL IMPACT,
supra note 37.
63. See POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 37.
64. Brown et al., supra note 14; see POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 37. The reasoning and
conclusions of Equal Rights for Women apply to Washington's ERA because even though that
article discusses the proposed federal ERA, Washington's ERA is nearly identical to the federal
version. See POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 37 (noting that the language of Washington's ERA is
virtually identical to that of the proposed federal ERA, under which "[e]quality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex").
65. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 549 n.286
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view, any separate-but-equal treatment of males and females is illusory
and violates the ERA:66 "[T]he constitutional mandate must be absolute.
The issue under the [ERA] cannot be different but equal.... Equality of
rights means that sex is not a factor.,
67
Both legislators and voters intended for the ERA to prohibit the use of
sex as a proxy for other traits.68 Sex serves as a proxy when laws
differentiate on the basis of sex instead of on the basis of a particular
characteristic, such as strength. 69 For example, although men on average
are physically stronger than women, a public employer filling a position
that required the ability to lift 100 pounds could not choose to interview
only men.7 ° Instead of phrasing the criterion in terms of the sex of the
potential employee, the employer would need to frame it in terms of the
ability to lift 100 pounds. Under this reformulation, the employer would
need to interview all qualified potential employees, irrespective of their
sex.
Under the subjective interpretation of the ERA that legislators
adopted,7' sex may not serve as a proxy.72 Senator Francis noted that
sex-based distinctions remain valid under the ERA only if they "relate[]
to the particular attributes of individuals and not to an attribute of their
sex." 73 One may not "simply... lump everyone together and say, [for
(2004); Martha Minow, Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 22
n.48 (2004).
66. See Brown et al., supra note 14, at 890.
67. Id. at 892; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (highlighting the
inherent inequality of separate-but-equal treatment); Cynthia Lewis, Comment, Plessy Revived: The
Separate but Equal Doctrine and Sex-Segregated Education, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 585, 625
(1977) (noting that by differentiating on the basis of sex alone, single-sex education is inherently
unequal).
68. See, e.g., SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 346-47 (Wash. 1972); Statement for HJR
61, supra note 15.
69. See Brown et al., supra note 14, at 889. Under the ERA, "differences in treatment.., shall
not be based on the quality of being male or female, but upon the characteristics and abilities of the
individual person that are relevant to the differentiation." Id. at 909.
70. Cf SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 346-47 (Wash. 1972); Statement for HJR 61,
supra note 15; Brown et al., supra note 14, at 889, cited with approval in POTENTIAL IMPACT, Supra
note 37.
71. See POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 37.
72. See Brown et al., supra note 14, at 889. Senator Francis explained that by eliminating the use
of sex as a proxy, the ERA would affect "discriminatory practices." See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42,
2nd Ex. Sess., at 346 (Wash. 1972). For example, the legal presumption at the time was that after a
divorce, mothers always received custody of children. Id. According to Senator Francis, the ERA
would give men "an equal chance" at gaining custody. Id.




example,] 'No woman can administer her husband's estate....
Similarly, a public employer may not prohibit men from applying for a
secretarial position merely because the employer does not want to hire a
male secretary.75 Courts may have upheld those types of distinctions in
the past, but, explained Senator Francis, such distinctions "have no valid
relationship whatsoever to the characteristics of the sexes" and should no
longer be acceptable.76
Like legislators, voters envisioned that the ERA would disallow the
use of sex as a substitute for particular characteristics.77 The voters'
pamphlet gave examples of situations in which sex had previously been
the sole basis for decisions but would no longer be so under the ERA.7 8
For example, child custody decisions would no longer be based on sex
but on an individual's ability to "provide a proper environment and
financial support. 79 In addition, courts would no longer be able to
uphold laws that discriminated on the basis of sex in approving
mortgages, extending credit, or issuing insurance.
8 0
2. Washington Case Law Demonstrates that the ERA Forbids
Distinctions Based on Sex Alone, Including the Use of Sex as a
Proxy for Other Traits
Washington state courts have held that differentiation on the basis of
sex alone violates the ERA.8' Differentiation is based solely on sex if the
state actor would have treated a given individual differently in a
particular situation had that individual been of the opposite sex.82 In
74. Id.
75. Id. at 346.
76. See id. at 347.




81. See, e.g., Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 877, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (1975).
82. See Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 661, 940 P.2d 642, 642-43 (1997) (holding that a
statute violated the ERA by placing a specific requirement on the unmarried father but not on the
mother of a child); Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 96, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980)
(holding that both husband and wife may recover for loss of consortium because allowing only the
husband such recourse violates the ERA). Washington courts have likewise found the converse to
be true, namely, that actions are in compliance with the ERA where an individual's sex does not
result in that person being treated in a particular way. See, e.g., Bolser v. Wash. State Liquor
Control Bd., 90 Wash. 2d 223, 224, 231, 580 P.2d 629, 630, 633 (1978) (upholding a regulation
prohibiting tavern owners from allowing topless table dancing at floor level and within six feet of a
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other words, the relevant test is whether, but for an individual's sex, that
person would have been treated the same as members of the opposite sex
in a given situation. 83 In Darrin v. Gould,84 a school district had denied
two female students, Carol and Delores Darrin, the opportunity to play
on an interscholastic high school football team due to a regulation
prohibiting girls from playing on boys' football teams.85  The
Washington State Supreme Court ruled that the regulation violated the
ERA, reasoning that because the Darrin sisters had met all other
eligibility requirements,86 sex per se rather than the girls' ability to play
formed the basis for the refusal. 87 The regulation effected a sex-based
classification in violation of the ERA because the Darrin sisters would
have been treated differently had they been male.88
Consistent with the ERA's legislative history,89 Washington state
courts have held that the ERA forbids the use of sex as a proxy for other
traits. 90 For example, in Willard v. Department of Social & Health
Services,91 the court held that a government agency had not violated the
ERA by billing an appellant for overpayment of public assistance
benefits where the agency had billed him not because of his sex but
because he was the payee of an assistance grant. 92 Similarly, the court in
customer on the grounds that the regulation applied equally to dancers of both sexes); Linda D. v.
Fritz C., 38 Wash. App. 288, 299, 687 P.2d 223, 228-29 (1984) (holding that the lower court had
not denied or abridged a father's rights on account of sex in violation of the ERA because neither he
nor the mother could raise certain claims).
83. See Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 877-78, 540 P.2d at 893 (reasoning that but for their sex, two
female students would have been able to play on an interscholastic football team); see also Guard,
132 Wash. 2d at 666, 940 P.2d at 645 (reasoning that but for an unmarried father's sex, he would
not be required to prove that he financially supported his child before being allowed to make a
wrongful death claim); Lundgren, 94 Wash. 2d at 96, 614 P.2d at 1275 (noting that but for a wife's
sex, she would have qualified for damages for loss of consortium).
84. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
85. Id. at 861, 540 P.2d at 884.
86. Id. Eligibility requirements included attending the requisite number of practice sessions,
passing a physical examination, and meeting medical insurance requirements. Id.
87. See id. at 875-77, 540 P.2d at 891-93.
88. Id. On the same day that the Darrin sisters were denied, an unqualified male student was
allowed to play on the same football team. Id. at 876, 540 P.2d at 892.
89. See, e.g., SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 346-47 (Wash. 1972); Brown et al.,
supra note 14, at 889.
90. See, e.g., Willard v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 91 Wash. 2d 759, 765, 592 P.2d 1103,
1107 (1979); In re Welfare of Hauser, 15 Wash. App. 231,236-37, 548 P.2d 333, 337 (1976).
91. 91 Wash. 2d 759, 592 P.2d 1103 (1979).
92. Id. at 765, 592 P.2d at 1107.
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In re Welfare of Hauser93 held that a decision to deprive a petitioner of
his parental rights did not violate the ERA where the decision was based
not on the petitioner's sex but on his lack of fitness as a parent.94
D. Legislative History and Washington Case Law Recognize Two
Narrow Exceptions to the ERA
Legislators contemplated, 95 and Washington courts recognize,96 two
exceptions to the ERA. Specifically, the ERA is circumscribed in two
narrowly defined sets of circumstances: (1) situations in which the
classification is based on actual physical differences between the sexes;
97
and (2) situations involving affirmative action programs intended solely
to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination.98 The first exception
allows classification by sex where a characteristic is unique to one sex.
99
A characteristic is unique to one sex if all or some members of one sex,
but no members of the other sex, exhibit that trait.'0 0 This exception is
subject to an important limitation: sex-based distinctions must derive
93. 15 Wash. App. 231, 548 P.2d 333 (1976).
94. Id. at 236-37, 548 P.2d at 337.
95. See POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 37 (relying on the subjective view propounded by Brown
et al., supra note 14, that allows for these two exceptions to the general rule prohibiting sex-based
classifications).
The privacy provision of the Washington State Constitution, article 1, section 7, states that "[n]o
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. Both legislators, see SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 346-47
(Wash. 1972), and voters, see Statement for HJR 61, supra note 15, contemplated that the ERA
would not supersede the constitutional right to privacy whenever individuals undressed, slept, or
performed bodily functions. The right to privacy would thus ensure that restrooms and hospital
wards did not become unisex. Statement for HJR 61, supra note 15. The right to privacy might also
arise in an employment context: it would be permissible for employers to consider only members of
a particular sex for a position if hiring someone of the other sex would result in an invasion of
privacy. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 346 (Wash. 1972). For example, employers
would still be allowed to advertise for a member of a particular sex to be a masseuse or a restroom
attendant. Id. This Comment does not address the right to privacy because single-sex public
education does not implicate the right to privacy.
96. See Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109,
127-28, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983) (holding that affirmative action programs designed solely to
mitigate the effects of past discrimination do not violate the ERA); City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90
Wash. 2d 584, 591. 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (holding that laws based on actual physical
differences between the sexes do not violate the ERA).
97. See Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d at 591, 584 P.2d at 921.
98. See Elec. Contractors, 100 Wash. 2d at 127-28, 667 P.2d at 1102.
99. See Brown et al., supra note 14, at 893.
100. Id.
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from physical characteristics unique to one sex, not secondary biological
or cultural characteristics found in greater or lesser degrees in both
sexes.101 Examples of secondary traits shared by males and females
include "interests in literature or athletics" and "degrees of physical
strength or weakness."' 1 2 Senator Francis gave examples of distinctions
based on physical characteristics that would remain valid under the
ERA)0 3 He noted that where only employees of a particular sex are able
to carry out certain functions, such as wet nurses who must necessarily
be female, sex-based distinctions would remain valid.1
0 4
Consistent with the ERA's legislative history, the Washington State
Supreme Court recognizes an exception to the ERA based on actual
physical differences.10 5 In City of Seattle v. Buchanan,'0 6 the court
concluded that an ordinance prohibiting the public exposure of female
breasts but not male breasts violated the ERA on its face. 10 7 Nonetheless,
the Buchanan court held that female breast exposure may be illegal even
if male breast exposure is not because an actual physical difference
exists between male and female breasts.1
0 8
Under the second exception to the ERA, otherwise permissible
affirmative action programs that are designed solely to mitigate the
effects of past discrimination do not violate the ERA.' 09 This exception
presumes that sex-based classifications in the context of affirmative
action programs may be necessary "in order to undo what has been
done" in the past. 10 In Southwest Washington Chapter, National
Electrical Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County,' 11 the court held that an
ordinance requiring county contractors to affirmatively seek female and
minority subcontractors violated the ERA on its face." 12 Nevertheless,
the Washington State Supreme Court held that the affirmative action
101. Id. at 893-94.
102. Id. at 893.
103. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 346-47 (Wash. 1972).
104. Id. at 346.
105. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978).
106. 90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978).
107. See id. at 591, 584 P.2d at 921.
108. See id.
109. See Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109,
127-28, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983).
110. See Brown et al., supra note 14, at 904-05.
111. 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983).
112. See id. at 111,667 P.2d at 1094.
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program did not contravene the ERA because it was designed to help
women and minorities win contracts in an arena in which they were
underrepresented due to past discrimination." 3
The ordinance at issue in Gary Merlino Construction Co. v. City of
Seattle" 14 was nearly identical to the one in Electrical Contractors in that
it required contractors to use a specified percentage of female and
minority subcontractors.1 5 Again, the Washington State Supreme Court
held that, although the ordinance effected a sex-based classification on
its face, it ultimately squared with the ERA because it fell under the
ERA's affirmative action exception. 1 6 The court thus found that the
classification was permissible." 7
In sum, the express language of the ERA prohibits the denial of rights
or responsibilities under the law based on sex. Courts employ an
absolutist standard when reviewing any such attempts to use sex as a
basis for classification. The ERA's legislative history and subsequent
case law demonstrate that the ERA forbids differentiation based on sex
alone. Such differentiation occurs where, but for an individual's sex, a
state actor would have treated that individual the same as members of
the opposite sex in a given situation. Finally, in line with the ERA's
legislative history, Washington courts recognize two narrow exceptions
to the ERA: (1) where actual physical differences exist between the
sexes, and (2) in the context of affirmative action programs intended
solely to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination.
113. See id. at 111, 123, 667 P.2d at 1093-94, 1100. In a case predating Electrical Contractors,
the Washington State Supreme Court upheld the validity of a state law on similar grounds. See
Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 308, 582 P.2d 487, 493 (1978). In Marchioro, members of
Washington State's Democratic Party contended that two state statutes violated the ERA. Id. at 300,
582 P.2d at 489. One statute required that the two State Democratic Committee members elected by
the county central committees be of opposite sexes, while the other provided that the State
Democratic Committee chair and vice-chair be of opposite sexes. Id. In holding both statutes
constitutional, the Washington State Supreme Court quoted from the section of Equal Rights for
Women that describes an affirmative action exception to the ERA. Id. at 305-06, 582 P.2d at 491
(quoting Brown et al., supra note 14, at 902-04). The Marchioro court reasoned that by countering
existing sex-based discrimination in politics, the statutes furthered the purpose of the ERA. See id.
114. 108 Wash. 2d 597, 741 P.2d 34 (1987).
115. See id. at 599, 606, 741 P.2d at 35-36, 39.
116. See id. at 606, 741 P.2d at 39.
117. See id.
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III. SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC EDUCATION VIOLATES
PENNSYLVANIA'S ANALOGOUS ERA
Pennsylvania's ERA,' 18 which mirrors Washington's in language,
intent, and application, 1 9 prohibits single-sex public education. 120 Of the
numerous states with equal rights amendments,21 ' only Pennsylvania has
employed an absolutist standard similar to Washington' s.122
Pennsylvania's ERA, like Washington's, prohibits distinctions on the
basis of sex alone, including separate-but-equal treatment and the use of
sex as a proxy for other characteristics 1 23 A Pennsylvania court has held
that single-sex public education violates Pennsylvania's ERA.
124
A. Pennsylvania's ERA Mirrors Washington's ERA in Language,
Purpose, and Application
The text, intent, and application of Pennsylvania's ERA parallel those
of Washington's. 125 Approved in 1971, Pennsylvania's ERA provides
that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in
I 18. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
119. See, e.g., Linton, supra note 34; Treadwell & Page, supra note 34; compare, e.g., PA.
CONST. art. I, § 28, with WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler,
328 A.2d 851, 855 (Pa. 1974), with SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46 (Wash.
1972).
120. See Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682, 709 (1983).
121. See Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment Law:
What Does It Portend for the Future?, 74 TEMP. L. REv. 579, 580 (2001) (noting that although the
required number of states failed to ratify the federal ERA, many states nonetheless approved their
own state versions of the federal amendment). Currently, seventeen states have ERAs. See ALASKA
CONST. art. 1, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 20; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3;
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 3; MD. CONST. art. 46; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 28; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST.
art. XXXI, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
122. See Linton, supra note 34; see also Treadwell & Page, supra note 34.
123. Compare, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1974), with Darrin v. Gould,
85 Wash. 2d 859, 877, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (1975); compare Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D.
& C.3d 682, 709 (1983), with Brown et al., supra note 14, at 890, cited with approval in POTENTIAL
IMPACT, supra note 37; compare Commonwealth v. Penn. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d
839, 841-42 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975), with In re Welfare of Hauser, 15 Wash. App. 231, 236-37,
548 P.2d 333, 337 (1976).
124. See Newberg, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d at 709.
125. See Linton, supra note 34; Treadwell & Page, supra note 34; compare, e.g., PA. CONST. art.
I, § 28, with WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851,
855 (Pa. 1974), with SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46 (Wash. 1972).
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the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the
individual."'126 This language is nearly identical to that of Washington's
ERA. 127 The intent of Pennsylvania's ERA-"end[ing] discriminatory
treatment on account of sex"' 28 -also mirrors that of Washington's'
29
Additionally, of the states with equal rights amendments, 30 only courts
in Washington and Pennsylvania have taken an absolutist approach in
ERA application, under which nearly all classifications based on sex are
invalid. 131 Given these similarities in language and intent, Pennsylvania
and Washington courts have similarly interpreted their respective state
ERAs.
132
Differentiation on the basis of sex alone is unconstitutional under both
Pennsylvania's and Washington's ERAs. 133 Such differentiation occurs
where individuals would have been treated the same as others but for
their sex. 134 In Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n (PIAA), 135 an interscholastic athletic association's regulation
prohibited girls from "compet[ing] or practic[ing] against boys" in
126. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28.
127. See WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (providing that "[e]quality of rights and responsibility
under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex").
128. Butler, 328 A.2d at 855; see also Henderson, 327 A.2d at 62 (noting that the "thrust" of the
ERA is "to insure [sic] equality of rights under the law and to eliminate sex as a basis for
distinction").
129. See, e.g., SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46 (Wash. 1972).
130. See supra note 121.
131. See Linton, supra note 34; see also Treadwell & Page, supra note 34.
132. See Linton, supra note 34; Treadwell & Page, supra note 34. Compare Hopkins v. Blanco,
320 A.2d 139, 141 (Pa. 1974) (holding that under Pennsylvania's ERA, if husbands may recover for
loss of consortium, wives must be able to do so as well), with Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94
Wash. 2d 91, 96, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980) (holding that in Washington, either spouse may
recover for loss of consortium); compare Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (Pa. 1974) (holding
that in Pennsylvania both parents share responsibility for their minor child), and Commonwealth v.
Rebovich, 406 A.2d 791, 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that in Pennsylvania both parents of a
child born out of wedlock are legally obligated to support the child), with Smith v. Smith, 13 Wash.
App. 381, 385-86, 534 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1975) (holding that in Washington both parents owe a duty
to their child).
133. See, e.g., Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682, 709 (1983); Darrin v. Gould,
85 Wash. 2d 859, 864, 540 P.2d 882, 885 (1975).
134. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851, 856-57 (Pa. 1974) (holding that a
provision prohibiting trial courts from imposing minimum sentences on female criminals where
male criminals were subject to minimum sentences violated Pennsylvania's ERA); Lashe v. N.Y.
County Sch. Dist., 9 Pa. D. & C.3d 772, 778 (1978) (holding that a provision of a school district
resolution under which husbands, but not wives, were liable for their spouses' occupation taxes,
violated Pennsylvania's ERA).
135. 334 A.2d 839 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
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athletic competitions.136 The PIAA court held that under Pennsylvania's
ERA, the regulation was unconstitutional on its face, regardless of
whether a separate girls' team existed. 137 The court ordered the athletic
association to allow male and female students to practice and compete
with each other in athletics, including the contact sports of football and
wrestling. 138 The Washington State Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion in Darrin when it held that an interscholastic athletic
association could not constitutionally prohibit girls from participating in
activities for which they were otherwise qualified, solely on account of
their being female. 139 The Darrin court was persuaded by the reasoning
in PIAA and quoted extensively from the PIAA decision.
40
In addition, sex may no more be used as a proxy in Pennsylvania1
41
than it may be in Washington. 42 Rather, the criterion that sex is standing
in for must itself be articulated and implemented. 143 Additionally,
Pennsylvania cases demonstrate an exception for physical differences
similar to the one that the Washington State Supreme Court enunciated
in Buchanan. 144
136. Id. at 840.
137. See id. at 841-42 (reasoning that even if a separate girls' team existed, a girl sufficiently
skilled to earn a place on a boys' team whose members played at a higher level would still be denied
equality by being refused the opportunity to play at the level at which she was otherwise capable).
138. See id. at 843.
139. See Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 864, 540 P.2d 882, 885 (1975).
140. See id. at 872-74, 877, 540 P.2d at 890-91, 893 (quoting Commonwealth v. Penn.
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 842-43 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)) (expressing
agreement with the rationale of the PIAA court).
141. See Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1974) (holding that financial need, not
sex, must be the deciding factor in determining whether a spouse receives certain costs associated
with divorce actions); Commonwealth ex. rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 380 A.2d 400, 403 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1.977) (holding that child custody decisions must be based on "sexually-neutral grounds" and
reasoning that mothers are no longer presumed to be more fit to care for children than are fathers);
PIAA, 334 A.2d at 843 (holding as violative of the ERA a regulation prohibiting girls from
participating in sports alongside boys, and noting that the mere fact that members of one sex exhibit
certain characteristics in larger numbers than do members of the other sex does not justify
classification by sex rather than by characteristic); Bilotta v. Palmer Twp. Athletic Ass'n, 33 Pa. D.
& C.3d 402, 408-09 (1984) (holding that an athletic association may not constitutionally prohibit
men from coaching a girls' sports team simply because its members believe that women are more
likely than men to possess traits that make them suitable to coach a girls' team).
142. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Hauser, 15 Wash. App. 231, 236-37, 548 P.2d 333, 337 (1976).
143. See supra note 141.
144. Compare, e.g., Wise v. Commonwealth, 690 A.2d 846, 849 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997)
(upholding a Pennsylvania regulation allowing female inmates, but not male inmates, to wear their
hair long because, among other things, physical differences between the sexes validated the
regulation's purpose of ensuring inmate health, security, and hygiene), with City of Seattle v.
Single-Sex Public Education
B. Single-Sex Public Education Violates the Pennsylvania ERA,
Regardless of Whether an Equal or Unequal Alternative
Opportunity Exists for the Other Sex
Although the issue has not yet come before Washington courts, a
Pennsylvania court has held that Pennsylvania's ERA forbids single-sex
public education.45 In Newberg v. Board of Public Education,46 a class-
action proceeding, 147 the Newberg court found in favor of female
students who either had applied or were eligible for admission to an all-
male public school but were or would have been rejected solely on the
basis of their sex. 148 Invoking PIAA, the court reasoned that because
male and female students cannot be prohibited from participating in
athletic activities together, even those involving contact sports, it would
be illogical to prohibit them from "intellectual interplay" in a classroom
setting. 149 The Newberg court rejected the concept of separate-but-equal
treatment, invalidating arguments that relied on the existence of an all-
female counterpart to the school that had rejected or would have rejected
the plaintiffs.' 50 Because the court held that the school board's policy did
not meet the standard of strict scrutiny, 1 the policy could not meet the
higher absolutist standard required under Pennsylvania's ERA.1
52
In sum, the language and purpose of Pennsylvania's ERA parallel
those of Washington's, and only Pennsylvania and Washington courts
employ an absolutist standard in analyzing sex-based classifications
under their state ERAs. Courts in both states have held that their
respective ERAs prohibit sex-based distinctions, which occur where, but
for an individual's sex, a state actor would have treated the individual in
the same manner as members of the opposite sex in a given situation.
Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting the
public exposure of female but not male breasts because of actual physical differences between male
and female breasts). Although Pennsylvania courts have not addressed the possibility of an
affirmative action exception in published opinions, they have cited Equal Rights for Women, see,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851, 855 (Pa. 1974) (citing Brown et al., supra note 14),
which propounds such an exception, see Brown et al., supra note 14, at 903-05.
145. See Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682, 709 (1983).
146. 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682 (1983).
147. Id. at 683.
148. See id. at 683, n.1, 710.
149. Id. at 709.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 711.
152. See Linton, supra note 34; see also Treadwell & Page, supra note 34.
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Additionally, a Pennsylvania court has held that single-sex public
education contravenes Pennsylvania's ERA.
IV. SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC EDUCATION VIOLATES
WASHINGTON'S ERA
Single-sex public education runs afoul of Washington's ERA by
effecting distinctions based solely on sex. The ERA expressly forbids
the denial of equality that single-sex public education necessitates.
1 53
The ERA's legislative history and interpretive case law, as well as
persuasive precedent from another jurisdiction, also demonstrate that
single-sex public education violates the ERA by using sex as an
exclusive classifying tool. 154 But for a particular student's sex, that
student would be able to enroll in a given class or school. Additionally,
single-sex public education does not currently satisfy either of the
narrow exceptions to the ERA. 155
A. By Separating Students According to Their Sex, Single-Sex Public
Education Violates the ERA's Express Prohibition Against
Denying Equality ofRights and Responsibilities
Single-sex public education runs afoul of Washington's ERA based
on the ERA's plain meaning. According to the text of the ERA, male
and female students must be treated in the same manner, with the same
rights and responsibilities. 156 Male and female students are not treated
equally, however, when on the basis of sex alone they are separated into
different classes or schools with, among other things, different teachers,
assignments, books, supplies, peers, and classroom dynamics. 157 Single-
sex educational settings therefore differentiate between male and female
students with respect to rights and responsibilities in contravention of the
153. See WASH. CONST. art. XXX1, § I.
154. See, e.g., Newberg, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d at 709 (persuasive authority); Damn v. Gould, 85
Wash. 2d 859, 860-62, 877-78, 540 P.2d 882, 883-84, 893 (interpretive case law); SENATE
JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46 (Wash. 1972) (legislative history).
155. Cf Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 127-28, 667 P.2d
1092, 1102 (1983) (discussing the affirmative action exception); Brown et al., supra note 14, at
893-94 (describing the physical differences exception).
156. See WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
157. See supra note 4 (highlighting the differences between single-sex schools, coeducational
schools comprised entirely of single-sex classes, and coeducational schools consisting of limited




B. In Light of Legislative History and Binding and Persuasive
Precedent, Single-Sex Public Education Violates the ERA by
Differentiating on the Basis of Sex Alone
Based on the ERA's legislative history and binding and persuasive
precedent, single-sex public education contravenes the ERA by failing
the "but for" test for sex-based distinctions. Legislative history and
binding and persuasive precedent demonstrate that if a state actor would
not have treated an individual differently but for that individual's sex,
that state actor has violated the ERA. 158 In a single-sex educational
setting, male students are assigned to one class or school and female
students to another. Single-sex public education thus violates the ERA
by creating a situation in which students, but for their sex, would be able
to enroll in a particular class or school. 159 Equal Rights for Women
explicitly states that "[t]here is no doubt that the [federal ERA] would
eliminate differentiation on account of sex in the public schools and
public university systems." 160 As noted above, the federal ERA, which
was never ratified, is nearly identical to Washington's.
1 61
The Washington State Supreme Court's holding in Darrin strongly
suggests that single-sex public education runs afoul of the ERA. Darrin
involved public-school students who were otherwise qualified to play on
an interscholastic athletic team.1 62 Single-sex public education involves
students who are otherwise eligible to enroll in a given class or school.
Like the denial of permission to play a sport in Darrin, assignment to a
particular class or school in a single-sex educational setting is based on
sex alone, not on a criterion valid under the ERA. The Darrin sisters
158. See, e.g., Newberg, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d at 709 (persuasive authority); Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at
877-78, 540 P.2d at 893 (binding precedent); SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46
(Wash. 1972) (legislative history).
159. This assumes two options: a boys' option and a girls' option. Given enough students,
additional boys' or girls' options might be available, but this does not alter the analysis. None of the
boys' options would be available to any girl, nor any of the girls' options to any boy. The analysis
also remains unchanged regardless of whether the educational setting at issue is a single-sex school,
a coeducational school consisting exclusively of single-sex classes, or a coeducational school
offering a limited number of single-sex classes. Being of the other sex forecloses a student from
admission to a single-sex school, just as it prevents that student from enrolling in a given single-sex
class.
160. Brown et al., supra note 14.
161. See supra note 64.
162. See Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 860-62, 540 P.2d at 883-84.
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could have been constitutionally denied the right to play on the athletic
team for valid reasons, such as failing to attend the required number of
practice sessions or lacking sufficient athletic ability.1 63 However, the
Darrin sisters otherwise met the stated criteria and were thus
impermissibly denied permission to play.' 64 Similarly, public schools
may, without violating the ERA, enroll only those students who live
within the school district's geographic area. 165 Public schools may also
rightfully deny a student entry into a calculus class, for example, if that
student has not demonstrated sufficient ability in a prerequisite algebra
class. 166 That said, in a single-sex educational setting, a student who
otherwise meets a school's residency requirements or any applicable
course aptitude requirements is impermissibly denied admission if that
student is simply of the "wrong" sex. Thus, as was true with the Darrin
sisters, 167 students in a single-sex educational setting are denied
opportunities based solely on their sex in violation of the ERA.
Single-sex public education also contravenes the ERA to the extent
that it uses sex as a proxy, which is prohibited under the ERA according
to legislative history, Washington case law, and persuasive precedent.168
Washington legislators specifically approved of the subjective view of
the ERA, 169 under which sex may not be used as a proxy. 70 Senator
Francis explicitly stated that distinctions must be predicated on
individuals' characteristics and not on sex alone.' 7' Under Washington
and Pennsylvania case law, using sex as a substitute for other traits is
unconstitutional. 172 Single-sex education uses sex as a proxy to the
extent that it classifies students not by their individual abilities but by
163. See id. at 861, 540 P.2d at 884.
164. See id. at 860-62, 540 P.2d at 883-84.
165. Cf id. at 861, 540 P.2d at 884 (noting that valid criteria under the ERA for participating in
interscholastic athletic activity included attending the requisite number of practice sessions, passing
a physical examination, and meeting medical insurance requirements).
166. Cf id.
167. See id. at 877-78, 540 P.2d at 893.
168. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1974) (persuasive authority);
Willard v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 91 Wash. 2d 759, 765, 592 P.2d 1103, 1107 (1979)
(binding precedent); SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 346-47 (Wash. 1972) (legislative
history).
169. See POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 37.
170. See Brown et al., supra note 14, at 889.
171. See SENATE JOURNAL, S. 42, 2nd Ex. Sess., at 345-46 (Wash. 1972).
172. See, e.g., Willard, 91 Wash. 2d at 765, 592 P.2d at 1107; Commonwealth v. Penn.
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 843 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
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their sex. If one rationale for single-sex education is strengthening
female students' performance in science classes, 173 as in the hypothetical
that begins this Comment, then sex is being used as a proxy to identify
students who do poorly in science. One way to reframe this distinction
so that the ERA is not implicated-while still providing female students
who need additional assistance in science with the help that they need-
is to separate students by ability: students (both male and female) who
have done poorly in science study together in one class, while students
(both male and female) who have already demonstrated skill in science
study together in a different class. Even if classes are not split evenly
across genders, all students would receive instruction at an appropriate
level. However, the decision to deny a student admission to a particular
class or school based solely on the student's sex, rather than on an
appropriate characteristic such as residency or ability, contravenes the
ERA.
C. Single-Sex Public Education Does Not Currently Satisfy Either
Exception to the ERA
Single-sex public education does not presently satisfy either of the
two narrow exceptions to the ERA contemplated in the Amendment's
legislative history and later set forth by Washington state courts. 17 4 First,
learning does not involve an actual physical difference between the
sexes. 175 Second, single-sex classes and schools are not affirmative
action programs designed solely to ameliorate the effects of past
discrimination. 
176
Single-sex public education does not fall under the actual physical
differences exception to the ERA. 177 An actual physical difference is one
that all or some members of one sex and no members of the other sex
possess. 178 It must be a physical difference, not one based on
"psychological, social or other characteristics of the sexes," because
173. See Mael, supra note 8.
174. See, e.g., Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d
109, 127-28, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983); City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584
P.2d 918, 921 (1978); Brown et al., supra note 14, at 893-94, 903-05, cited with approval in
POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 37.
175. Cf Brown et al., supra note 14, at 893-94, 906.,
176. Cf, e.g., Elec. Contractors, 100 Wash. 2d at 127-28, 667 P.2d at 1102.
177. Cf Brown et al., supra note 14, at 893-94, 906.
178. See id.
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such characteristics are shared by the sexes. 179 For example, members of
both sexes exhibit "active [and] passive attitudes" and are interested in
athletics and literature.1 80 Learning is an example of a shared trait, rather
than an actual physical difference, because it is not something that all or
some members of one sex, and no members of the other sex, do, or do in
a particular way. Differences in learning abilities and styles are unlike
the physical differences between male and female breasts that the
Buchanan court recognized.18' Single-sex public education thus does not
come within the actual physical differences exception to the ERA.'82
Single-sex public education also fails to satisfy the other narrow
exception to the ERA under which sex-based differentiation is
permissible if it is part of an affirmative action program intended solely
to mitigate the effects of past discrimination.' 83 In both Electrical
Contractors and Gary Merlino, the Washington State Supreme Court
found that the programs in question satisfied the affirmative action
exception.1 84 Both programs explicitly supported women's involvement
in a traditionally male-dominated arena, namely, subcontracting.' 85
Single-sex classes and schools, however, do not constitute "affirmative
action programs" pursuant to the term's commonly understood meaning.
The ordinances at issue in Electrical Contractors and Gary Merlino
179. Id. at 893.
180. Id.
181. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978).
182. The actual physical differences exception might still apply if educators ultimately found
conclusive physical evidence that all males learn differently from all females.
183. Cf Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109,
127-28, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983).
Moreover, Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978), see supra note 113, is
inapposite. The Marchioro court followed the same approach as did the Electrical Contractors
court. Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 127-
28, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983); Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 305-06, 582 P.2d at 491-92.
Consequently, Marchioro is merely a precursor to the affirmative action exception to the ERA
which, although it had been contemplated at the time of the ERA's passage, see supra Part I.D,
Washington courts had not yet articulated. Furthermore, Marchioro is inapposite because the
statutes at issue aimed to equalize men and women by including women in an arena in which they
were traditionally underrepresented, thereby allowing them to work alongside men in furtherance of
the ERA's purpose. Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 306, 582 P.2d at 492. Conversely, in single-sex
education, the aim is to segregate the sexes, rendering them unequal.
184. See Gary Merlino Constr. Co. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 597, 598-99, 741 P.2d 34,
35-36 (1987); Elec. Contractors, 100 Wash. 2d at 111-13, 667 P.2d at 1093-94.
185. See Gary Merlino, 108 Wash. 2d at 598-99, 741 P.2d at 35-36; Elec. Contractors, 100
Wash. 2d at 111-13, 667 P.2d at 1093-94.
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sought to integrate women into the subcontracting workforce,186 whereas
single-sex public education segregates male and female students into
separate classes or schools. Moreover, even if the sole purpose of single-
sex public education is ameliorating the effects of past discrimination, as
opposed to simply creating a more effective educational environment,
single-sex public education will not correct the problem because
separate-but-equal treatment is inherently unequal.1 87  Curing the
historical disenfranchisement of women by relegating female students to
their own class or school does not make them equal to male students;
rather, it perpetuates their inferior position.188 As Equal Rights for
Women makes clear, as long as there is "any differentiation in legal
treatment on the basis of sex," women will continue to bear an inferior
role in society.
189
Single-sex public education could potentially come within the
affirmative action exception if a study definitively concluded that single-
sex education ameliorates the effects of past discrimination against
female students.1 90 If such a finding were limited to math and science
classes, then single-sex schools would not escape the purview of the
ERA, but single-sex math and science classes could. 191 Presently,
however, single-sex public education does not satisfy the affirmative
action exception to the ERA.
In sum, the express language of the ERA, its legislative history, and
binding and persuasive precedent all demonstrate that state actors may
not treat individuals differently on the basis of sex alone. Single-sex
public education thus violates the ERA by effecting distinctions based
solely on sex. Furthermore, single-sex public education does not
currently satisfy either of the two narrow exceptions to the ERA.
186. See Gary Merlino, 108 Wash. 2d at 598-99, 741 P.2d at 35-36; Elec. Contractors, 100
Wash. 2d at 111- 13, 667 P.2d at 1093-94.
187. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Moreover, single-sex education is
inherently unequal because it effects arbitrary sex-based classifications. See Lewis, supra note 67, at
625. Additionally, legislative history, see supra Part lI.C. 1, and persuasive precedent, see supra Part
III.B, demonstrate that separate-but-equal educational settings would not survive scrutiny under
Washington's ERA.
188. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
189. See Brown et al., supra note 14, at 873.
190. Cf, e.g., Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d
109, 127-28, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983) (finding an affirmative action exception to the ERA in the




Washington's ERA prohibits single-sex public education. The ERA
expressly forbids distinctions on the basis of sex alone, thereby
preventing a state actor from treating an individual differently in a given
situation based solely on that person's sex. Washington state courts
employ an absolutist standard in ERA analysis and accordingly fimd
nearly all classifications based on sex invalid. Single-sex public
education, including separate-but-equal educational settings, results in
impermissible sex-based classifications by limiting, on the basis of sex
alone, the educational opportunities available to a given male or female
student. Single-sex public education also violates the ERA to the extent
that it uses sex as a proxy, where, for example, a school board forces a
female student like Sam to enroll in a single-sex biology class because it
concluded that on average, female students do poorly in science classes
as compared to male students, rather than because Sam herself needs
extra support in science. Furthermore, single-sex public education does
not presently fall under either of the two narrow exceptions to the ERA:
learning does not involve an actual physical difference between the
sexes, and single-sex classes and schools are not affirmative action
programs designed solely to ameliorate the effects of past
discrimination. By effecting sex-based discrimination that does not
currently satisfy either of the recognized exceptions, single-sex public
education thus denies the equality that is the touchstone of the ERA.
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